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This thesis analyzes intelligence support to NATO Special Operations and the 
training that facilitates this capability and recommends a model to increase 
competence in the field of intelligence. The training provided by the NSTEP has 
led NATO SOF intelligence personnel to fill critical positions that have afforded 
operational elements to execute missions. The successes of ISAF SOF have 
been attributed to the skilled analysts that have developed clear pictures of the 
enemy threat and the analysis of raw information. These skill sets are critical to 
ensure that the commander’s guidance is met and the gaps answered for the 
operational elements. 
The steps taken by the NSHQ to meet the need for skilled intelligence 
professionals have been pivotal to the growth of the NSTEP schoolhouse’s 
course curriculum. Additionally, increased accesses to ISR assets and 
interactions with other intelligence agencies have levied added responsibilities on 
NATO SOF intelligence officers to become more knowledgeable about multi-
disciplinary intelligence operations. This requirement forces NATO SOF 
intelligence officers to become experts in multiple fields. This access enables 
these officers to seek out additional training to meet these needs. To ensure 
these requirements are met, does NSHQ need to develop a curriculum that 
provides management training for intelligence officers to meet the need of 
overseeing multisource intelligence elements? 
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We will continue to maintain the capacity to defend our allies 
against old and new threats. We will also continue to closely 
consult with our allies as well as newly emerging partners and 
organizations so that we revitalize and expand our cooperation to 
achieve common objectives. And we will continue to mutually 
benefit from the collective security provided by strong alliances. 
—President Barack Obama1 
A. OVERVIEW 
Since the beginning of the coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
importance of intelligence has not only enhanced intelligence sharing among the 
allied militaries, but has also exposed the need for further improvements. Joint 
and combined staffs have been routinely placed into positions of providing 
targeting data, planning, and leading collection efforts for multinational 
operations. These intelligence sections and personnel have been tasked to 
provide direct support to the operations of their organizations, and, on occasion, 
have been integrated into combined staffs to support units from different 
countries. When this integration occurs, tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs) must be synchronized to ensure mission success. This synchronization 
can require intelligence personnel to modify, learn on the job, or attend specific 
training prior to deploying into theater. On occasion, these intelligence officers 
have been newly assigned into positions without having the basic intelligence 
skill sets to fulfill their duties. When situations like this occur, on the job training 
can limit the effectiveness of the unit’s operations.   
When officers are reassigned to new positions, the assignment is based 
on the required professional progression of the officer. Additionally, these new 
duty positions might be assigned prior to formalized training and education. 
                                            
1 Barack Obama, “The National Security Strategy,” Washington, DC, 2012, 41, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, 
(accessed 18 September 2012). 
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When this occurs, the effectiveness of the staff officer is diminished, leading to 
decreased productivity. If integrated into a multinational staff or organization, this 
officer will likely be assigned to positions typically reserved for more junior ranks. 
Due to the supervisory requirements of filling the position of a staff intelligence 
officer, the lack of training and experience could place these individuals into 
positions of an analyst in lieu of a “manager.”  Their limited access to receive 
early and mid-career formalized training prior to their assignments to staff 
intelligence officer billets or deployments have placed them at a disadvantage.2  
A specialized curriculum for all newly assigned staff intelligence officers would 
eliminate the need for short term courses and would enhance the tactical skillsets 
of these intelligence personnel.    
B. BACKGROUND 
Developing partner capabilities is inherent to U.S. Special Operations 
Forces (SOF), but typically focuses on the tactical, team, and individual tasks. 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is the vehicle utilized by USSOF as a platform to 
develop partner capacity and enhance domestic issues and concerns or 
establish interoperability among the SOF communities. These FID engagements 
conducted by USSOF may include, in addition to the tactical tasks, financial, 
intelligence, and law enforcement assistance authorized by the Department of 
State (DOS) and administered by the DoD.3  In some instances when FID 
engagements expand to mission planning, this may be the first opportunity in 
which some staff officers are exposed to the staff intelligence and operational 
process. Reasons may vary among the militaries of different NATO SOF 
                                            
2 This is not an issue found in all SOF units, but is primarily associated with the newly 
established SOF organizations of NATO countries that are still developing the support staff to 
facilitate operations. Some of these shortcomings have been mitigated by deploying National 
Intelligence Cells (NICs) to provide the tactical intelligence needs for the SOF task groups. 
3 Field Manual (FM) 3–05.2-Foreign Internal Defense, 1–2. ARSOF Soldiers are uniquely 
qualified to advise their HN counterparts and trainees on how best to approach regional or 
transnational rivalries or how to deal with outside pressures from potential transnational spoilers. 
Historically, because of some similarities between the TTP used to conduct FID and those used 
to conduct other ARSOF core activities, there has been confusion and incorrect usage of the 
term. FID involves the support of a standing government and its lawful military and paramilitary 
forces. 
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countries for limited formalized training opportunities for staff intelligence officers, 
such as funding, seat allocation, and deployment cycles.4 
A limited opportunity to attend domestic formalized intelligence training is 
a reality in the current system. Most NATO countries provide even less training 
opportunities to their SOF intelligence officers prior to assuming their positions.5  
Education such as this is critical when supporting operations in a deployed 
environment. In the fall of 2008, the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) 
identified the need to establish an ISAF SOF intelligence organization. This 
organization would be able to provide key information and analysis to the multiple 
ISAF SOF task forces operating in the Afghanistan Theater. Part of this 
development required the NSCC to create a short-term training regime that 
would prepare NATO SOF analysts prior to their deployment to Afghanistan. The 
first course developed was the NATO SOF Intelligence Course (NSIC), a thirty 
day, resident classroom instruction that focused on analyst level skills associated 
with targeting and target development. Later in 2009, the NSCC developed the 
NATO SOF Advanced Intelligence Course, which increased the analyst’s 
capability by providing training on the use of Biometrics, threat finance, 
Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX), and IED TTPs.6 
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The scope of this research is to examine the existing formalized domestic 
training that is currently provided to NATO SOF staff intelligence officers that 
                                            
4  This researcher has experienced this issue during deployments to Afghanistan and during 
NATO exercises with NATO SOF intelligence staff officers. Most staff intelligence officers 
encountered had received on the job training and / or attended a basic intelligence course at 
NSHQ prior to or shortly after assuming their duty position.   
5 This statement is based on survey results (to be discussed later in this document) and the 
author’s experience working with NATO SOF intelligence officers during previous assignments 
and deployments.   
6 The NATO SOF Training and Education Program has further developed courses that 
complement the analyst’s capability down range, but has not developed a “manager’s” course to 
oversee all intelligence functions at the unit level. The current agenda for training and the training 
calendar can be accessed on the NATO SOF Headquarters NSTEP website, 
http://www.nshq.nato.int/NSTEP/.  
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focus on the key mission sets of Special Reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action 
(DA), and Military Assistance (MA). Additionally, this research will attempt to 
display how NSHQ’s NSTEP model and how the curriculum facilitates existing 
training and experiences. NSHQ can expand and capitalize on midcareer staff 
intelligence officer training by providing experiences for these officers. This 
examination will identify any key gaps within the internal and external training 
and development of SOF intelligence staff officers and will provide a roadmap to 
enhance the capability to support internal SOF missions during times of crises. 
As depicted in Figure 1, NATO has identified a framework for the 
dissemination of information from theater, national sources, and agencies to the 
operational units conducting operations. Although this figure illustrates all 
elements that can be in theater, not all of them are necessary for SOF to conduct 
operations. Within this thesis, the author will examine what components that 
comprise the intelligence support elements, primarily at the Special Operations 
Task Group (SOTG) and Special Operations Task Unit (SOTU) level.7   
                                            
7 The size of a SOTG can vary, but is roughly defined as a headquarters that possesses all 
staff functions and commands and controls at least two SOTUs. A SOTU is defined as a special 
operations team comprised of 8–15 members. 
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Figure 1.  Intelligence Support Flow8 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
In order to establish interoperability among intelligence officers from 
different countries, they must receive similar training. This research will attempt 
to answer the question, “Does NSHQ need a resident NATO SOF Staff 
Intelligence Officer’s course to increase the management capability for multi-
discipline intelligence operations?”  Although any type of training is beneficial, 
this training environment must attempt to meet the needs for all intelligence 
officers supporting ISAF operations, to include regional and domestic SOF 
requirements in the future. In some instances, this might be the only formalized 
training that some intelligence staff officers receive for the mission.   
The intent of this research will not focus solely on the limited domestic 
training opportunities, but rather emphasize a standardized curriculum that 
                                            
8 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Special Operations Coordination Center, SOTG 
Manual, Version 1, 11 December 2009, 6–2. 
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provides a common framework of intelligence tasks that best support the inherent 
SOF missions of SR, DA, MA as annotated in STANAG 2555-Intelligence 
Training.9  Next, this research will attempt to illuminate the existing system within 
some of the NATO SOF partner’s domestic training pipelines, the availability 
afforded to NATO SOF organizations, and the assignment criteria to staff 
intelligence positions. 
E. RELEVANT AND CONCEPTUAL LITERATURE 
Unclassified literature regarding the training of NATO SOF Intelligence 
professionals is very limited. For this thesis, the author will draw on NATO 
doctrine and publications, mission analysis briefs and CONOPs, the training 
curriculum at the NSTEP, and the input from the survey data and the author’s 
previous experiences serving with NATO SOF. 
 Global economic crises are currently forcing countries to reduce spending 
and better manage their fiscal budgets. One area that is typically affected is the 
military. Reducing military budgets leads to diminished research and 
development. Acquisitions receive less freedom of spending, troop reduction is 
forced, and limiting initial entry is exercised. Education and training time is 
reduced at all levels as well. These measures force the need of future 
cooperation and coalitions to reduce the strain and burden on a single country’s 
military and budget. On 5 January 2012, President Barack Obama stated that the 
“future downsized U.S. military would need to look beyond the current conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan to forge ahead, strengthening and relying on the 
capabilities of partnerships.”10  This vision not only depends on established and 
new relationships with partner militaries, but the interoperability that is achieved 
by common competencies when operating in a multinational environment. Gates 
                                            
9 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] NATO Standardization Agency [NSA]. 
“Standardized Agreement (STANAG) 2555-Intelligence Training,” 2011, 1. 
10 Barack Obama, Strategic Defense Review press conference, 5 January 2012, 
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2012/01/live-obama-speaking-defense-cuts/47030/ 
(assessed 8 February 2012). 
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states “SOF interoperability is networking, which describes methods employed to 
foster personal and professional collaborative relationships or communicate 
through technical means.”11  The emphasis is focusing on is the technical 
communications that are associated with intelligence procedures and 
management. When these procedures and management become a seamless 
flow in the work environment, collection management, analysis, and production 
increases; facilitating the operator on the ground. Throughout multiple 
deployments and multinational exercises, this researcher has participated as a 
member, cell director, and observer/controller. This researcher witnessed 
firsthand the productivity of an integrated and synchronized intelligence section, 
possessing similar skills and capabilities and the dysfunctional sections that 
continued to struggle to manage internal functions.12     
This synergy is only accomplished when there are common standards and 
TTPs that are practiced and exercised among the various military units, including 
intelligence professionals and their organizations. Currently, threats are 
becoming more transnational. These threats place more emphasis on 
collaboration regarding methods of engagements and intelligence sharing. The 
benefit of engaging these threats as a combined effort allows military 
organizations with regional and cultural expertise to have significant input. In 
situations where combined operations are the primary means to mitigate threats, 
the contributing militaries must be able to integrate their personnel without a 
break in tempo or capability. As these organizations combine their personnel, 
“their effectiveness and impact would be greater if they were interoperable and  
 
                                            
11 Michael E. Gates, Creating SOF Networks:  the Role of NATO Special Operations as a 
Testing Ground for SOF Integration, (Monterey:  NPS Press, 2011), 20.  
12 This researcher has served in various capacities at the tactical and operational level 
during multiple NATO SOF exercises (Jackal Stone-10, Cold Response-08, 09), as the only U.S. 
observer/controller during Poland’s Delta-10 full spectrum intelligence exercise, deputy director 
for intelligence ISAF SOFFC, and multiple intelligence exchanges, bi-lats, mil-to-mil 
engagements, and partner assessments with NATO SOF organizations. 
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trained to common standards of excellence.”13  When staffs have a shared level 
of education and capability, efficiency and effectiveness facilitate operations and 
planning processes.   
The need to be able to collaborate effectively in a multinational 
environment is not a new concept and will likely be needed again in the future. In 
their thesis, Ara, Brand, and Larssen state the following: 
By creating a standard intelligence skill set via the NSTEP, the 
units had a smaller gap in intelligence capability, which increased 
the credibility of forces. As the credibility of the forces increases, so 
does the trust. Other organizations trying to replicate NSHQ’s 
success should concentrate on capacity building across the force.14 
The NSCC identified gaps in intelligence capability among NATO SOF 
intelligence personnel. As a result, they developed the NSTEP vehicle, which has 
produced competent SOF analysts. The NSTEP courses provide the immediate 
tools for the tactical analyst to support the operator on the ground, but these 
courses need to be expanded to cultivate the professional managers to oversee 
these processes. NATO SOF currently has the opportunity to not only provide the 
tactical analyst the tools needed to support his or her deployed task force, but 
also provides vital analysis to domestic contingencies. As the analyst becomes 
more capable in his/her abilities to solve problems and meet the commander’s 
intent, the need to establish a skilled staff intelligence officer becomes more vital 
to manage, train, and mentor the overall intelligence process for that SOF 
organization.   
The courses provided by the NSTEP have served ISAF operations 
admirably. This education has increased the operational success of the overall 
SOF effectiveness in Afghanistan. The NSTEP courses have established a solid 
foundation for the deployed analysts and officers to the ISAF SOF Fusion Cell 
                                            
13 David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Creating a NATO Special Operations Force, 
Defense Horizons, 2006, 54, 4–5.  
14 Martin J. Ara, Thomas Brand, and Brage Andreas Larsse, Help a Brother Out:  A Case 
Study in Multinational Intelligence Sharing, NATO SOF (Monterey: NPS Press, 2011), 48. 
 9
(SOFFC) and their SOTGs; expanding their knowledge on the different aspects 
of targeting in a combat zone (i.e., non-kinetic target and its effects).15  During 
the researcher’s deployment to the SOFFC, analysts that had not completed the 
NSIC were immediately faced with the disadvantage of working with unfamiliar 
software and research tools taught during the course. This shortcoming was 
evident in the analysis and production of the analyst.16 
Timely and accurate intelligence is the most critical aspect for successful 
operations on the battlefield. Without the relevant enemy and environmental 
information, the maneuver elements operate in the blind. With the current 
emphasis on multinational operations, this burden on intelligence staffs to 
provide a clear threat picture and sound analysis is more vital than ever. Allied 
Join Publication (AJP)-2 states that:  
The full impact of intelligence cannot be effectively applied unless 
both the intelligence itself and the information from which it is 
derived can be shared. Interoperability, in this case the ability to 
exchange information and intelligence, is the key to successful 
multinational operations.17  
The intelligence staff officer and his or her staff must be able to not only 
effectively analyze information, but must also develop products and 
assessments. The will enable the officer to share this analysis and production, 
both vertically and horizontally to units and staffs that can operationalize this 
                                            
15 During the author’s deployment to SOFFC, increased emphasis was placed on stressing 
and disrupting the financial networks and other non-kinetic lines of operation resulting in isolating 
funding to insurgent activity. 
16 The learning objective for the NSIC establishes a NATO SOF standard for intelligence 
development for forces deployed in support of NATO missions. NSHQ, “NATO SOF Training and 
Educational Program (NSTEP),” http://www.nshq.nato.int/NSTEP/. During the researcher’s 
deployment, two analysts working in the SOFFC and multiple analysts imbedded with some of the 
task groups did not attend the NSIC. This lack of training hindered the communication between 
the SOFFC analysts and the task group analysts, as well as meeting the intent of the task group 
commander and the regional command (RC) and operation effectiveness. Although missions 
were successful against targets, the process of focusing on the removal leadership outweighed 
than the focus of disrupting or degrading the network as a whole.   
17 North Atlantic Treaty Organization AJP-2 “Allied Joint Intelligence, Counterintelligence and 
Security Doctrine P 2,” 2003, 1–1-1. 
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information. In a multinational environment, common intelligence practices and 
TTPs are essential during the exchange of information is conducted. 
In 2008, the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) conducted a study 
to examine broad trend in SOF structure, organization, capabilities, 
interoperability, and resourcing. This study represented a compilation of research 
and analysis intended to provide a reference point to inform the continued 
optimization of national and NATO SOF.18  As a result of this study, a 
determination was made that SOF Intelligence would be needed to understand 
more complex and culturally diverse adversaries. This demanded more 
sophisticated products and enhanced interdepartmental and interagency 
cooperation.19  This need for intelligence capability and synergy requires 
operational experience and formalized training. The next chapter will examine the 
composition of intelligence support elements for SOF organizations. This section 
will provide the models that the U.S. Army Special Forces, Rangers, and NATO 





                                            
18 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operation Coordination Center, “The NATO 
SOF Special Operations Forces Study,” 2008. 
19 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operation Coordination Center, “The NATO 
SOF Special Operations Forces Study,” 2008, Appendix 7. 
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II. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO SOF 
Special operations are normally planned in considerable detail, and 
SOF relies on accurate, current intelligence to ensure that plans 
meet precisely the situation in the intended target area. Access to 
timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence is 
essential for a successful operation. 
—AJP 3.520 
A. WHY IS SOF INTELLIGENCE IS DIFFERENT  
This chapter will outline special operations and the intelligence elements 
that support their missions. The following pages will additionally cover the types 
of missions conducted by SOF and the intelligence needed to provide success. 
Both conventional military and SOF need timely, accurate, multi-source 
intelligence to support operations. However, the nature of some SOF operations  
requires a more precise, delicate, and sometimes non-military focus to facilitate 
the nature of their operations. Congress, the National Command Authority, and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have mandated nine primary missions for Army SOF 
(ARSOF) to execute during peacetime and war.21 Of these operations, ranging 
from pre-conflict to major theater of war (MTW) and SOF elements need 
additional information in order provide engagement and targeting strategies that 
are executed by conventional forces. These operations are conducted to set 
conditions in potential areas of conflict, develop internal security forces to defend 
their homeland and even conduct deep strike operations against a foe’s strategic 
centers of gravity.   
                                            
20 North Atlantic Treaty Organization AJP-3.5 “Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations,” 
2009, 1–4. 
21 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3–05.102. Army Special Operations Forces 
Intelligence 2001, 1–15. These nine missions are:  Unconventional Warfare, Direct Action, 
Special Reconnaissance, Foreign Internal Defense, Combatting Terrorism, Psychological 
Operations, Civil Affairs, Counter Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Information 
Operations. 
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Special Operations are described as military activities conducted by 
specially designated, organized, trained, and equipped forces using operational 
tactics, techniques, and modes of employment not standard to conventional 
forces. These activities are conducted across the spectrum of conflict 
independently, integrated with, or in coordination with operations of conventional 
forces to achieve political, military, informational, and economic objectives. 
Politico-military considerations may require low prominence, covert or discreet 
techniques, and the acceptance of a degree of physical and political risk not 
associated with conventional operations.22 
Doctrine claims that the sensitive nature of SOF operations requires the 
need for enhanced intelligence based on three factors:  level of detail, timeliness 
and accuracy of information, and operational element and analyst interface.23  
When SOF elements conduct operations, the composition of the element is 
typically smaller in numbers, placing the unit at a disadvantage against the 
enemy. The level of detail and the accuracy of the intelligence provided are 
critical elements in order to mitigate the threat posed by enemy forces. 
Additionally, the sensitivity of the targets, the quick strike capability, and the 
intelligence gleaned from SOF operations, forces the intelligence and the 
operations team to work more closely together. This ability to collaborate 
operations and intelligence is essential for successful operations. When 
conducting operations during a pre-conflict engagement, the information provided 
to SOF elements delivers the needed aspects of cultural and political factors 
needed to succeed in their operations. 
B. THE FOCUS OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT 
SOF units conduct many types of operations ranging from times of peace 
to state-on-state conflicts. AJP 3.5 explains this spectrum of conflict over four 
                                            
22 North Atlantic Treaty Organization AJP-3.5 “Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations,” 
2009, 1–1. 
23 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3–05.102. Army Special Operations Forces 
Intelligence 2001, 2–5. 
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phases: Peacetime Military Engagement, Peace Support Operations, Counter 
Irregular Threat Operations, and Major Combat Operations.24  During peacetime 
engagements, SOF is a vital vehicle to develop interoperability among the 
different militaries, enhanced cooperation, conduct of capabilities, and execution 
of intelligence exchanges.   
During the next three phases of conflict, SOF may be called on to conduct 
the three primary missions of Special Reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action (DA), 
and Military Assistance (MA). Understanding the threat, the political and physical 
environment, and cultural atmospherics are factors that intelligence must attempt 
to satisfy during the planning and execution of SOF operations. According to 
McRaven, “good intelligence is needed to develop a simple plan. Good 
intelligence simplifies a plan by reducing the unknown factors and the number of 
variables that must be considered.”25  As stated before, the understanding that 
provided by intelligence allows the operators to conduct missions with less risk 
and higher chances for success.  
C. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF U.S. SOF INTELLIGENCE 
1. U.S. Special Forces 
U.S. Special Forces intelligence support is divided into two main entities; 
the battalion S2 section and the Military Intelligence Detachment (MID) (see 
Figure 2). These two organizations provide the SFODAs and the staff the critical 
support that facilitates operations and day-to-day activities. The battalion S2 
section is the overall director for managing all intelligence operations, production, 




                                            
24 North Atlantic Treaty Organization AJP-3.5 “Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations,” 
2009, 1–2, 1–3. 
25 McRaven, W., Spec Ops:  Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare, 1995, 12. 
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battalion S2 section is comprised of three personnel; a captain, senior NCO, and 
a CI sergeant. This management section can be modified based on the nature of 
deployment.26 
 
Figure 2.  Special Forces Group MID27 
This relatively small section, even if modified, is not able to support the 
battalion’s intelligence requirements alone. The SF battalion’s MID provides the 
tactical tools and capabilities needed to collect, exploit, and produce the 
intelligence products needed to the operators. An SF battalion MID is comprised 
of 32 personnel, providing all source, CI/HUMINT, and SIGINT support. The MID 
can be deployed in its entirety or split based on mission requirements and 
intelligence needs. Having the MID provides the S2 the means to determine the 
best tools and assets needed to answer the commander’s requirements.   
                                            
26 U.S. Army Field Management Support Agency, 2012. The USAFMS provides the MTOE 
breakdown of all U.S. Army organizations. Although this table is based on unit requirements and 
missions, deployments can influence actual personnel numbers and skill sets needed. 
27 Army Field Manual 3–05.102. Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence. 
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2. U.S. Army Rangers 
Similar to the U.S. Special Forces battalions, U.S. Army Ranger battalion 
S2 sections serve as management cells for supporting intelligence assets, but 
possess more analytical capability. The Ranger S2 section contains up to eight 
personnel, providing all source analysis to operations. Like the MID model, the 
Ranger Special Troops Battalion (STB) provides an enhanced intelligence 
company (MICO). This company provides multi-source, tactical intelligence to 
deployed Ranger task forces. This company’s capabilities and functions range 
from collection management and dissemination to all source production, 
CI/HUMINT, tactical SIGINT support, terrain analysis, and tactical UAV.28 
3. How SOF Intelligence Supports Operations  
Although the organic intelligence section at the battalion/SOTG level can 
provide analysis, collection management, and production, the additional support 
provided by the Special Forces MID and the Ranger MICO adds critical 
capabilities. Tailoring deployed intelligence sections allows the commander to 
have access to multisource intelligence, allowing for better corroboration and 
clarity to the environment. As previously stated, elements of the MID and MICO 
can deploy completely or be portioned out based on the mission requirements. 
When this element deploys, these modified sections can easily form fusion 
cells. These cells are capable of collaborating multisource intelligence from 
higher and adjacent headquarters, with information collected from subordinate 
teams. Typically, fusion cells are located at the brigade level or above, but the 
assets and capabilities provided by the MIDs and MICOs replicate these 
functions. The nature of the fusion cells is communicating with other intelligence 
                                            
28 U.S. Army Field Management Support Agency, 2012. This MICO provides deployed 
Ranger TF’s greater organic support without reaching out to additional agencies for various 
intelligence disciplines. The MICO can deploy special intelligence packages based on mission 
sets and requirements. 
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organizations, Inter Agency partners (IA), and Other Government Agencies 
(OGA) allowing for cooperation and information flow between units.29 
D. THE NATO SOF MODEL 
1. NATO SOTG Intelligence Structure 
The Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) is the lowest level of a 
tactical SOF organization with full functioning S1-S6 staff functions. These 
dedicated staff sections provide the SOTG commander with the necessary 
decision making information needed to execute the mission. The S2 section for a 
SOTG is the first level of a multi-intelligence discipline section. It has the ability to 
conduct intelligence operations independently. The NSCC’s SOTG Manual states 
the intelligence section is the primary center that serves the COM SOTG, the S2, 
the SOTG staff, and the Special Operations Task Units (SOTU) for all 
intelligence requirements.30  Although these sections can be task organized 
differently based on the mission requirements, the S2 section should always 
have analysis, production, and collection management capabilities. Based on the 
SOTG’s mission and commander’s requirements, the S2 section can have the 
additional functions of HUMINT/Counter-Intelligence oversight (J2X) and UAV 
controllers. Table 1 provides a basic S2 section components necessary to 
provide the SOTG the needed information to facilitate decision making and 
operations. 
 
                                            
29 Lushenko, P.  “Partnership ‘Till it Hurts” The Use of Fusion Cells to Establish Unity of 
Effort Between SOF (Yin) and Conventional Forces (Yang), 2010. 
 
30 NSCC, SOTG Manual, 2009, 6–4. This sample configuration allows the SOTG S2 to be 
able to provide analysis for the commander and staff and for the SOTU’s, while still being able to 
push information higher. This staffing example would serve as a minimum manning layout and 




Table 1.   Example of SOTG S2 Structure (From NSCC SOTG Manual, 2009) 
Table 1 provides a guideline for battalion (SOTG) S2 sections. Unit 
commanders can require staff intelligence officers to modify this structure to best 
support the mission. Based on these mission requirements, deployment areas, or 
additional support assets available, certain positions can be replaced by 
additional analysts or collectors. Within some organizations, tactical UAVs are 
used not to exploit, but rather to assist current operations at the team (SOTU) 
level, thereby eliminating the need for the UAV analyst position at the SOTG.   
2. Additional Support to NATO SOF Intelligence 
NATO SOF organizations typically do not possess a MID or MICO that 
directly supports special operations. The additional support needed to facilitate 
the necessary intelligence requirements. Increasing the size of the SOTG 
intelligence section or from a formalized National Intelligence Support Team 
(NIST) provides the necessary support to operations. This NIST provides critical 
reach back for the SOTG, to national intelligence agencies. Kristofferson argues 
that the NIST will provide the SOTG intelligence section the needed support with 





the handling of intelligence agreements (bilateral or multilateral), providing 
liaison-personnel to inter-agencies, and providing a reach-back to the nation’s 
own intelligence service.”31 
This reach-back capability provides the SOTG intelligence section the 
ability to receive operational and strategic intelligence assessments, while 
focusing on the tactical tasks. With minimal staffing, the intelligence section calls 
on the NIST for additional support resulting in timely intelligence to the 
commander, staff, and operational teams. Although this concept serves as a 
multiplier to NATO SOF organizations, not all deployed NATO SOF units have 
NIST support readily available. 
3. ISAF SOF Fusion Cell 
During the early days of January 2009, the NSCC formally established the 
ISAF SOF Fusion Cell in Kabul to provide intelligence support to ISAF SOF 
SOTGs. This cell was organized to have the ability to reach out into the ISAF 
intelligence community and fuse multisource intelligence to support ISAF SOF 
operations in theater. The SOFFC was staffed by analysts, both officer and 
enlisted, that would directly support each SOTG, providing continuity and 
strength for this partnership. In most cases, the SOFFC analysts were provided 
by the SOTG intelligence section, thus maintaining this organic relationship. 
Figure 3 illustrates how the task force analysts are laid out in the SOFFC, as well 
as the additional intelligence support that this organization provides to the task 
forces. 
However, this partnership is not always possible due to limits on 
deployment numbers placed on units and the need for maintaining sufficient 
numbers of personnel at the SOTG S2 section. In these cases, analysts are still 
assigned to support the SOTG, even though they might not be from the same 
country. This is still a successful means of support, but there are learning curves 
                                            
31 Kristofferson, E., “A Requirement for a National Intelligence Support Team in Direct 
Support of Special Operations Forces Task Groups in Multinational Operations,” 2009.   
 19
on the parts of both the SOFFC analyst and the SOTG S2. Among these issues 
are language barriers, comprehension of the SOTG’s TTP’s, and full clarity of the 
commander’s intent. 
 
Figure 3.  Generic Example of the SOFFC Organization  
(Produced by Author) 
An additional benefit of the SOFFC is the location and proximity of the 
organization relative to the other intelligence agencies and commands. SOFFC 
analysts are able to conduct face-to-face engagements with “adjacent” SOTG’s 
through their analyst. This is accomplished by providing deconfliction on threat 
reporting. This deconfliction is critical, as the enemy will not respect unit 
boundaries and will move freely across the battlefield. Also, the SOFFC is able to 
coordinate with theater level intelligence organizations that can provide additional 
reporting, collection, and analysis on their SOTG’s area of operation. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the author explained in detail intelligence structures 
needed by SOF organizations in order to improve the chances of having 
successful missions. The battalion/SOTG level intelligence section and 
specialized units are the key elements that provide the teams and the staff with a 
clear picture of the battlefield. Although this section is able to conduct the needed 
analysis and production, their ability to coordinate with outside intelligence 
organizations is a major factor.   
The next chapter focuses on the needs of the individual intelligence 
professional. This analysis will attempt to illustrate that the intelligence soldier is 
required to accomplish a multitude of tasks, while displaying the ability to conduct 
asymmetrical assessments. Additional explanation will be made regarding these 
requirements. Emphasis will be given to the impacts that different training 


















III. NATO SOF, AFGHANISTAN, AND THE SOF FUSION CELL 
A. BACKGROUND 
As of February 2006, NATO did not possess SOF capacity in Afghanistan. 
The nations that provided SOF units fell under the U.S. led Combined Joint 
Special Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A).32  As a result of operations with 
Afghanistan, ISAF SOF leadership quickly realized that NATO SOF lacked direct 
intelligence support that would enable it to be more effective on the ground. In 
early 2006, NATO SOF had two SOTGs conducting operations in support of the 
ISAF Commander while all other SOF components fell under the CJOSTF-A 
structure. In May 2006, an interim Special Operation Coordination Element 
(SOCE) was established to provide synchronization of operations for ISAF SOF. 
In July of that year, the SOCE was redesigned as the Special Operations 
Command and Control Element (SOCCE).33 
In 2008, NATO SOF elements in Afghanistan had the ability to reach back 
to the SOCCE for support. However, the lack of a dedicated ISAF SOF 
intelligence cell remained an issue in providing a fused picture of the theater to 
the drive operations. In order to assist the SOTGs with the intelligence picture in 
Kabul, the SOCCE established the Kabul Effects Group (KEG). The primary 
focus for this cell focused on the activities and operations within the capital, not 
the entire theater.34  This organization possessed a vision of integrating multiple 
intelligence agencies with the end state of collaborating and sharing intelligence. 
                                            
32 NSCC, ISAF SOF Assessment 2008:  Report to SACEUR, 15 MAY 2008. The Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), through the SHAPE Special Operations Office (SSOO) 
tasked the NATO Special Operations Coordination Center (NSCC) to assess SOF supporting 
NATO’s ISAF in Afghanistan. This report documents that assessment and is intended to highlight 
progress made since February 2007 and to identify what support and enablers are required in the 
future, 3.  
33 NSCC, ISAF SOF Assessment 2008, 4. 
34 NSCC, ISAF SOF Assessment 2008, 7. 
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B. THE INITIAL CONCEPT  
Following the 2008 ISAF SOF Assessment, the need to further develop 
the intelligence capacity and sharing remained forefront to support operations. 
As a result of operations within Afghanistan, ISAF SOF leadership realized that 
NATO SOF lacked direct intelligence support that would enable it to be more 
effective on the ground.35 In July 2008, the NSCC began mission analysis to 
develop an organization that would provide the needed intelligence support and 
the sharing and fusion of information to support the SOTGs. This concept was 
renamed the ISAF SOF Fusion Cell (SOFFC) and became a single location for 
the exchange of intelligence in order to support ISAF SOF operations in 
theater.36 In early 2009, the SOFFC reached initial Operational Capacity (IOC) 
with minimum manning and equipment with the end state of reaching Full 
Operational Capacity (FOC) early 2010.37  
With the concept of the SOFFC moving forward, the purpose of the 
organization had to become defined. The objectives for this organization had to 
be able to gather, fuse, share, and provide information and intelligence to the 
ISAF SOF units across the theater. Additionally, the analysts residing in the 
SOFFC had to serve as an extension of the SOTG, thus increasing the 
operational outputs of the task groups. Next, the SOFFC had to maximize 
information and resources. With an increasing number of allied and partner SOF 
elements operating throughout Afghanistan, the need for this fusion center to tap 
into the vast intelligence resources available from allied partners was clearly a 
requirement. Lastly, the SOFFC must have access to information and  
 
 
                                            
35 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] NATO SOF Headquarters [NSHQJ. “The 
Formation of the NSHQ Special Operations Component Command-Core.” Mons, Belgium: 1 MAY 
2012, 6. 
36 NSHQ. “CONOPS for Special Operations Forces Fusion Cell in Afghanistan.” Mons, Belgium, 
24 September 2012:  2. 
37 NSHQ. “CONOPS for Special Operations Forces Fusion Cell in Afghanistan.” Mons, Belgium, 
24 September 2012:  2. 
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intelligence from Troop Contributing Counties (TCN} non-military agencies, as 
well as from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) 
Intelligence agencies.38 
Initially, the task of the SOFFC was to fuse multinational and multi-source 
intelligence to support NATO SOF operations across the Afghan theater.39 The 
SOFFC was able to accomplish this due to the organization serving a direct 
support role to the SOTGs, having direct input and providing recommendations to 
targeting boards. Providing professional and developmental training and 
programs for its members is yet another way to accomplish the goal. Ara et al. 
write, “The SOFFC is focused on garnering information from a multitude of 
sources, fusing that information with operational requirements to produce, and 
then disseminate, actionable intelligence to NATO SOTGs in Afghanistan.”40 In 
order to achieve this, the SOFFC requires raw and analyzed information, 
coordination among various intelligence organizations, quality trained intelligence 
analysts, and acute quality control on products disseminated back to the SOTGs. 
C. MANNING 
The SOFFC has grown considerably since its IOC. This growth occurs in 
more than just intelligence analysts, but also includes other government agencies 
that provide key expertise, such as counter lED analysis. In early 2009, the 
SOFFC stood up with a hand full of personnel that were provided on a voluntary 
basis. As of mid-2012, the SOFFC has grown almost eight times its original size 
with assigned personnel from over a dozen nations.41 
The SOFFC is a unique entity that is manned by the stakeholders. There 
is neither a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) nor a Crisis Establishment 
                                            
38 NSHQ. “CONOPS for Special Operations Forces Fusion Cell in Afghanistan.” Mons, Belgium, 
24 September 2012:  3. 
39 NSHQ. “CONOPS for Special Operations Forces Fusion Cell in Afghanistan.” Mons, Belgium, 
24 September 2012:  4. 
40 M., Ara, T. Brand, B., Larssen, “Help a Brother Out,” 40. 
41 The contributing nations include both NATO and Non-NATO Allied nations. 
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(CE) structure that identifies long term manpower resourcing solutions. The 
NSHQ has the responsibility of engaging its stakeholders to ensure a steady 
manpower supple. Each participating nation provides specialized, highly trained 
personnel capable of carrying out the SOFFC mission. Participation by these 
nations helps to maintain the vital link between SOF intelligence entities and the 
various national intelligence support units operating in ISAF. The SOFFC relies 
on the participating nations to ensure that all positions are filled with qualified 
personnel. Should nation fail to provide this manpower, the SOFFC cannot be 
successful and provide the link to receive and provide quality intelligence data.42 
D. TRAINING 
Based on the results of the 2008 SOF Assessment, the need for 
developing competent intelligence professionals was identified as a critical. In 
early 2008, the NSTEP was providing two courses of instruction regarding NATO 
SOF: the Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command 
(CJFSOCC) Staff Officers Course and the CJSFSOCC Planning and Operations 
Course. The focus of these courses was to provide overview and training on the 
SOF staff planning cycle, synchronization, battle tracking, and SOF C2 
systems.43 
In June 2008, the NSTEP developed the initial courses providing 
intelligence training that would prepare deploying NATO SOF personnel to the 
SOFFC. This intelligence training was developed to provide intelligence 
standards for SOF deployed in support of NATO missions. This initial training 
was broken down into three, three-week classes that covered the basics of 
intelligence, and then progressed to more advanced capabilities. The NATO SOF 
INTEL 101 course began with an introduction to basic intelligence analysis and 
the integration of INTEL software, along with an explanation of how the software 
                                            
42 NSHQ. “CONOPS for Special Operations Forces Fusion Cell in Afghanistan.” Mons, Belgium, 
24 September 2012:  C-1. 
43 NSCC, “NSTEP Overview Brief,” April 2008, slides 7–8. 
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incorporates all of the intelligence disciplines. The intelligence and operational 
cycles were covered in-depth. The comprehensive nature of the course enabled 
those attending with little and or no intelligence or operational experience could 
grasp what it takes to complete an intelligence product as well as a NATO Target 
Intel Package (TIP).44 
The NATO SOF INTEL 201 course began with a compressed overview of 
software along with the intelligence and operational cycles and other materials 
learned in the NSIC 101. NSIC 201 was to serve as the intermediate level of 
NATO SOF Intelligence production with a heavy focus on the use of software 
and navigation of the NATO SOF Network (BICES). The main objective of NSIC 
201 is to produce actionable intelligence using all available intelligence from 
current operations in ISAF.45 Finally, the NATO SOF INTEL 301 course provided 
a compressed overview of software along with the intelligence and operational 
cycles and other materials learned in the NSIC 101 and NSIC 201. NSIC 301 is 
the advanced level of NATO SOF Intelligence production with a heavy focus on 
the use of software and navigation of the NATO SOF Network (BICES).46 
These three courses provided the initial intelligence training that would 
lead the NSTEP to develop additional classes. The expansion of the NSTEP has 
grown to meet the need of more than analyst training in support of ISAF SOF, but 
has created a foundation of core intelligence based disciplines that will provide 
the support for future NATO SOF requirements beyond ISAF. This thesis will 
cover the NSTEP curriculum and methodology in the next chapter. 
E. CHALLENGES 
To this date, the SOFFC has provided key and critical support for ISAF 
SOF operations. This success has largely been due to the professional soldiers 
that staff this theater-focused organization. Once challenge that the SOFFC 
                                            
44 NSCC, “Calling Letter for NATO SOF Intelligence Courses 101, 201, 301,” June 2008, 10. 
45 NSCC, “Calling Letter for NATO SOF Intelligence Courses 101, 201, 301,” June 2008, 11. 
46 NSCC, “Calling Letter for NATO SOF Intelligence Courses 101, 201, 301,” June 2008, 13. 
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initially faced was working with multi-INT, multisource information in a 
multinational environment. Within this setting, the challenge of working through 
national caveats with troop contributing countries can create issues, especially 
with time sensitive targeting. 
Additional challenges that the SOFFC has experienced is the assignment 
of newly credentialed intelligence analysts. Although these analysts have 
attended training at the NSTEP, their military background is not INTEL. During 
these situations, there are both positive and negative aspects. First, as a former 
operator, this analyst truly understands the critical information needed to execute 
an operation. On the other hand, lacking experience as an intelligence analyst 
limits aspects of critical thinking that intelligence professional learn over their 
career. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided key information about the growth of ISAF SOF and 
the SOFFC. The basis of the SOFFC grew out of a need to provide a focal point 
for intelligence support for all of NATO SOF and served as a requirement to 
formalize NSTEP training for deploying personnel. Although the SOTGs were 
able to reach back to the SOCCE, the SOCCE maintained a limited capability to 
fully support all intelligence needs across the theater. Additionally, this chapter 
offered a view on the initial curriculum of intelligence training provided to prepare 
analysts deploying to support ISAF SOF. These three courses set the beginnings 
of a NATO SOF campus that today provides training beyond intelligence 
centered instruction. This growth in training has enabled interoperability among 
NATO SOF and has facilitated a common framework for multinational operational 
needs. 
In addition, this chapter attempted to shed light on the challenges that a 
newly established organization faces. These challenges are not exclusively for 
NATO SOF, but are experienced theater wide when operating in a multinational 
environment. There has been extensive research on the functional support to 
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units in the Afghan theater and how organizations overcome the challenges 
operating in this multinational environment. These challenges are common 
hurdles and much be addressed accordingly. The SOFFC, NSTEP, and NSHQ 
have provided remedies for these issues, which have, allow the SOFFC to 
continue to support the SOTGs. The next chapter will focus on the operational 
cycle the SOFFC analysts utilize to support operations: Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, 
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IV. THE NSTEP AND THE F3EA-D PROCESS 
A. BACKGROUND  
NSHQ’s NATO SOF Training and Education Program (NSTEP) has 
become the backbone of providing key education for deploying NATO SOF 
personnel to Afghanistan. The NSTEP began in 2007 to provide overview 
instruction of NATO SOF operations. Initially this was accomplished by providing 
two courses:  the Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Component 
Command (CJFSOCC) Staff Officer’s Course and the CJFOCC Planning and 
Operations Course. These two courses provided instruction for NATO SOF Staff 
Officers to staff and operate in a NATO SOF headquarters. The overview of 
these classes was to serve as a doctrinal basis for staff planning, 
synchronization, and battle tracking.47   
In addition to the NATO SOF staff officer requirement, intelligence training 
was seen as a needed foundation to maintain success for ISAF SOF operations 
in Afghanistan. In 2008, the NSCC created a series of basic intelligence courses 
that would build on one another in efforts to prepare ISAF SOF intelligence 
personnel. These three courses were one week in length each and were based 
on the standing ISAF SOF intelligence needs of the task forces.  
In 2011, STANAG 2554-Intelligence Training, identified the required topics 
of instruction in order to meet NATO’s requirement for intelligence personnel that 
participating NATO nations must adopt in order to ensure a common approach to 
achieve interoperability at the highest level.48  This STANAG identifies both the 
basic and the advanced requirements needed to fully support operations (Figure 
4 and 5). 
                                            
47 NSCC, “The NATO SOF Training & Education Program (NSTEP), 2007, slide 4. 
48 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] NATO Standardization Agency [NSA].  




Figure 4.  STANAG 2555-Intelligence Training, 2011, Annex C-1 
 
Figure 5.  STANAG 2555-Intelligence Training, 2011, Annex C-1 
B. THE BEGINNING OF NATO SOF INTELLIGENCE TRAINING 
As covered in the previous chapter, the NSTEP intelligence-training 
curriculum began with the three-part NATO SOF Intelligence Courses. This 
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foundation provided the basics for non-intelligence, and limited trained personnel, 
to operate within ISAF SOF. This basic curriculum covered the needed tools that 
allowed the analysts to develop targets for the SOTGs, while providing overviews 
of analysis and critical thinking. As with any foundation, the NSTEP had to grow 
to meet future needs within ISAF SOF. These three courses began the 
development of an expanded curriculum that would grow into multiple blocks of 
instruction covering the multi-disciplines of intelligence. 
C. THE NSTEP AND THE TRAINING THAT MEETS THE OPERATIONAL 
NEEDS 
The above-mentioned intelligence courses provided the initial foundation 
for what the NSTEP has developed into today. Not only has the NSTEP grown to 
meet the need of more than analyst training in support of ISAF SOF, but has 
created a foundation of core intelligence based disciplines that focuses on the 
support for future NATO SOF requirements beyond ISAF. The NSTEP now 
has developed nine intelligence-based courses that are scoped to meet the 
needs for ISAF deployments, but allow attendees to support their own SOF 
organizations. NSHQ has identified the skill sets needed for NATO SOF 
intelligence professionals to build on their career development.   
In late 2011, the NSHQ J2, working closely with the NSHQ, began training 
directorate to refresh all of the intelligence training blocks and to address any 
capability gaps from the ISAF SOF Transition Plan. This organization attempted 
to add focus regarding NATO SOF’s growing global interests.49  As of today, the  
NSTEP has developed nine intelligence-focused courses that has provided, not 
only a foundation, but has enhanced functional capability for intelligence 
professionals.   
 
                                            
49 NSHQ, “NSHQ J2, SOIB, and SOFFC:  And the Formation of the NSHQ Special 
Operations Component Command,” May 2012, 10. 
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Figure 6 illustrates the core intelligence courses in green. This chart 
shows how the classes emphasize current operations and utilize best practices 
to ensure solid training. With the growing number of courses, the NSTEP has 
developed a course block scheme to cultivate NATO SOF intelligence 
professionals. Within the first block, students are introduced to the basics of 
intelligence. This block is comprised of the NATO SOF Intelligence Course 
(NSIC) and the Technical Exploitation Operations (TEO) Course. The NSIC is the 
introductory analyst course that initially exposes students to analytical 
methodology, critical thinking, research techniques, and the tools necessary for 
supporting NATO SOF missions. The TEO course provides TTPs to both 
analysts and operators on the conduct of on-site collection and exploitation. 
Students in the course will gain valuable knowledge of the NATO SOF Tactical 
Exploitation Kit and will learn critical TTPs for handling host nation personnel.50  
 
Figure 6.  Current NSTEP Course Offerings51 
                                            
50 NSTEP Training Calendar, 
http://www.nshq.nato.int/NSTEP/page/calendars/calendar/?ID=NSTEPTraining.  
51 NSHQ, “Training and Readiness Overview,” July 2012. 
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The intermediate phase, or block two, is also comprised of two classes:  
the Threat Network Analysis Course (TNAC) and the Forensic Exploitation 
Course (FEC). The TNAC is a seminar-based forum on the methodology of 
analyzing and understanding the facets of a threat network, drawing on current 
and historical events for explanation.  The analysts attending this course will 
learn effective means to debilitate a network based on human and technological 
factors.  This instruction additionally covers counter-threat finance, counter-IED 
analysis, and cultural and social network analysis.52  The FEC provides the 
overview on the methodology associated with triaging and exploiting material 
found on operational objectives. Additionally, the students will learn the 
procedures to disseminate this information forward for further analysis.53 
The final phase of the NSTEP’s career development is the instruction of 
the “additional skillsets.”  This phase is focused on providing students with a 
more narrowed instruction of specific disciplines within the intelligence field.54  
The courses offered during this phase include the Warrior View Imagery 
Exploitation Course, the NATO SOF HUMINT Introductory Course, the NATO 
SOF Precision Geo-Location Familiarization Course, the Intelligence Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) / Full Motion Video Seminar (FMV), and the Maritime 
Intelligence Course. These additional five courses allow the students, and their 
commands, to specialize and become better equipped in supporting operations. 
This specialization not only develops subject matter experts in these particular 
fields, but also increases the confidence of the students, allowing them to 
become interoperable in multinational environments. 
                                            
52 NSTEP Training Calendar, 
http://www.nshq.nato.int/NSTEP/page/calendars/calendar/?ID=NSTEPTraining.  
53 NSHQ, “NSHQ J2, SOIB, and SOFFC:  And the Formation of the NSHQ Special 
Operations Component Command,” May 2012, 10. 
54 NSHQ, “NSHQ J2, SOIB, and SOFFC:  And the Formation of the NSHQ Special 
Operations Component Command,” May 2012, 10. 
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D. THE F3EA-D PROCESS 
The process that both the NSTEP uses to focus training and what the 
SOFFC uses to focus its intelligence efforts is the F3EA (Find, Fix, Finish, 
Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate) model. This process is a circular and 
continuous procedure that is constantly being fed with new information, resulting 
with newly updated products being used by the SOTGs. For this process to be 
successful, it requires data collection, information sharing, skilled analysts, and 
sound quality control. The information that feeds the SOFFC comes in many 
forms and from numerous originators. Raw HUMINT reports, post operational 
debriefings, unevaluated imagery, and open source provides the analysts in the 
SOFFC the initial roadmap used to identify potential targets. This data feeds the 
Analyze, Find, and Fix blocks within the cycle. The analysts must understand the 
nature of the threat, the reliability of the reporting, and production of coherent 
intelligence assessments used to drive SOTG operations. Figure 7 is a graphical 
representation of how the process is executed. 
 
Figure 7.  The SOFFC F3EA-D Process55 
                                            
55 SOFFC, Way Ahead, May 2011, slide 5. 
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As with other cycles in military planning, the F3EA-D is a continuous cycle 
that relies on the input of new information and analysis. The NSTEP has tailored 
its training to provide the necessary tools for the NATO SOF intelligence 
personnel to support all varieties of SOF operations. The Find phase provides a 
starting point for the intelligence and operations functions to identify targets 
within the battle space. Within this phase, the Warrior View, HUMINT, and the 
ISR/FMV courses teach students the methodologies and practices needed to 
develop targets. 
As the information is processed, the Fix phase allows the intelligence to 
focus on locational data. This will allow the execution of operations. Ongoing ISR 
facilitates this cycle and is based on different intelligence disciplines. HUMINT, 
SIGINT, and IMINT allow the analysts to refine the information needed to 
execute the operation. Another term that is common during this phase is “trigger”; 
a signal that identifies the target can be serviced. This trigger can be derived 
from any of the intelligence disciplines and requires dedicated forces to conduct 
the operation when it meets the information threshold. 
The Finish phase is operationally focused, but is crucial within this cycle. 
The post operational activities of this phase lead directly into the Exploit phase. 
This phase is critical as it provides new and updated information on the current 
target, as well as future, follow on targets. This not only includes exploiting 
materials from the objective, but conducting post operational debriefs and tactical 
questioning of detainees routinely fill in gaps of information requirements. The 
NSTEP has greatly increased SOF’s capabilities to support this phase through 
the FEC and TEO courses. The material and the exercises conducted allow 
those on site to gather raw information that feeds the later phases of this cycle. 
In the view of the author, the next two phases, Analyze and Disseminate, 
are synonymous with one another. In other words, the analysis conducted during 
this phase leads to intelligence that drives future operations. Conducting further 
analysis of this intelligence is accomplished through dissemination to higher and 
adjacent organizations. This action allows for further analysis and collaboration 
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and further refining of key information concerning the threat. These two phases 
together acts to widen the aperture of the threat activity in the area and facilitate 
common perspectives on the battle space. Intelligence organizations can then 
provide output on the situation. The critical thinking, network analysis, and 
analytical methodologies taught in the NSIC and the TNAC provides students the 
tools to breakdown the threat and focus on disruption techniques. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Providing an overview and background of the NSTEP, this chapter 
outlined how this organization has refocused its instruction over time. Relying on 
student and deployment feedback is crucial for ensuring that the latest TTPs and 
problem sets being experienced by NATO SOF are addressed in the classroom. 
Additionally, the author has provided the overview of the targeting methodology 
that, not only drives operations, but also has influenced training material and 
topics. This cycle does not have a starting point and never has an end. This is 
important to understand in that analysts need to continuously update information 
and seek additional tactics to disrupt threat networks. 
The educational foundation provided by the NSTEP has afforded many 
NATO SOF intelligence personnel additional skill sets. For others, this training 
provides their first exposure to this discipline. Although the majority of the 
courses that are offered at the NSTEP are intelligence focused, many students 
that attend are not branched intelligence. These non-intelligence branched 
students attend this training for a variety of reasons, some due to their current or 
future assignments as SOTG intelligence staff officers or members. The next 
chapter will focus on survey-collected data from NSTEP students and instructors, 
both past and present. This chapter will look at the benefits of the training 





V. RESULTS AND DATA  
A. SURVEY RESULTS 
1. Demographics  
The NATO SOF intelligence personnel survey consisted of 20 questions, 
administered over a four-month period. The target population for this survey was 
current and former students of the NSTEP training curriculum, NSHQ J2 
personnel that maintained input in the training topics, and instructors that lead 
the training. The survey was sent out to 185 former and current students by e-
mail and administered personally to personnel resulting in 33 completed surveys, 
or an 18% completion rate. The survey questions focused on five research areas:  
survey pool demographics, training, deployment history, personal capability 
assessment, and student assessments by NSTEP instructors.56   
The survey sample that responded provided a wide range of ranks and 
years of military experience. The sample population consisted of 79% (27) 
officers, ranging from OF1 to OF5 and 21% (7) enlisted personnel, ranging from 
OR2 to OR9. The largest concentration from the survey was located in the OF3 
rank (9). The years of service from the survey sample ranged from five years to 
greater than 20 years with the largest concentration residing in the more than 
20 years at 42%, (14). The final demographic attribute surveyed was the military 
career path of the sample pool. The survey revealed that 85% of the sample was 
branched as an intelligence officer or analyst, 30% was a tactical leader / SOF 
operator, 12% serving as an operations officer, and 6% for transportation and 
signal support. The results total greater than 100% is due to respondents 
alternating duty assignments between operations and intelligence (Figure 8)   
 
 
                                            




Figure 8.  Survey Pool Demographics 
2. Analysis of Demographics 
The overall demographics of the survey pool indicate that a large number 
of students that attend training at the NSTEP are experienced soldiers and are in 
ranks that typically fill key leadership positions. Although there was a spread in 
student rank and years of service, NATO SOF organizations appear to be using 
the NSTEP as a foundation for the individual training of their personnel. Even 
though the NSTEP offers course covering disciplines other than intelligence, the 
survey pool largely consisted of intelligence personnel attending intelligence 
focused courses.     
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B. DEPLOYMENT HISTORY 
1. Overview of Operational Experience 
The operational tempo of NATO militaries have increased over the past 
11 years and have focused on counter terrorism, counter piracy, humanitarian 
assistance, and peace keeping operations. These operations have placed NATO 
SOF personnel in positions where enhanced skill sets and the need to operate in 
multi-national have become a standard for NATO operations. The summer 0f 
1992 saw NATO’s first major peace keeping operations in the Balkans where 
forces were charged to uphold a United Nations arms embargo on weapons in 
the Adriatic Sea.57   
Since 2001, NATO has continued to contribute to peace and security 
operations that have ranged from NATO SOF’s first counter terrorist operation 
following the events of September 11 to humanitarian assistance in support 
operations in Darfur, Sudan. These operations have shown the increased 
versatility of NATO capabilities and the need to increase interoperability during 
these categories of missions. Figure 9 illustrates how the survey pool has 
deployed and what types of operations they were involved in during these 
missions. Due to NATO SOF’s commitment to Afghanistan, 69.7% of the 
respondents have participated in ISAF SOF operations. As covered in Chapters 
III and IV, the growth NSTEP training has been attributed largely due to ISAF 
SOF requirements. 
                                            
57 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. “NATO Operations and Missions,” (accessed 
23 October, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm). 
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Figure 9.  Survey Pool Deployment Experience 
C. ATTENDANDCE IN NSTEP TRAINING COURSES 
From 2008 to 2011, the NSTEP has graduated nearly 2500 students from 
their various courses and have projected another 1200 students in 2012.58  Over 
the past four years, the NSTEP graduation rate has increased on average 27% 
each year and due to the need for increased interoperability and multi-national 
operations, the number of graduates is expected to climb.59  Figure 10 provides 
the number of students, by course, who participated in this survey. Even though 
the NSTEP offers non-intelligence focused training, according to the 
respondents, the SOF Intelligence and the Advanced Intelligence courses was 
attended by the majority of the students.   
 
                                            
58 NSHQ, “Training and Readiness Overview,” July 2012. 
59 NSHQ, “Training and Readiness Overview,” July 2012 
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Figure 10.  NSTEP Courses Being Attended 
D. REASON FOR ATTENDING NSTEP TRAINING 
Figure 11 illustrates the breakdown of survey responses regarding NSTEP 
attendance. Although this survey question was not focused solely on the 
intelligence focused courses being offered, the responses indicate that 40% use 
these courses to prepare for upcoming deployments. This high number could be 
argued to reflect the relevance of the material being taught and the validity that 
the NATO SOF community sees in this program. This endorsement of the 
NSTEP is evident when looking at the total responses regarding attendance.     
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Figure 11.  Reason for Attending Training at the NSTEP 
E. PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF CAPABILITIES 
A critical aspect regarding training is personal assessment of capabilities. 
These assessments lead to attendance of additional courses and provide needed 
feedback to the NSTEP on ways to modify training to better meet the needs of 
the students. After looking at the survey pool demographics and operational 
experience, the respondents provided input of their strengths and weaknesses 
regarding STANAG 2555’s basic and advanced intelligence capabilities (see 
Figures 4 and 5) and the SOFFC’s F3EA-D cycle (see Figure 7). The rating scale 
provided the respondents a range from 1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree 
on their assessment of being able to fulfill the tasks, functions, and roles asked in 





Table 2.   Rating Scale Used in Survey 
1. Skillsets  
First, the respondents provided their assessments on their ability to exploit 
various intelligence disciplines that they would be required to analyze during 
operations. These disciplines included Open Source, SIGINT, IMINT, and 
HUMINT. The input provided indicates that average responses marginally agree 
with the respondents’ ability to utilize information from these disciplines (Table 3). 
These four intelligence disciplines provide the most common sources of 
information to support operations.   
 
Table 3.   Views on Skillset Capabilities 
2. Functions 
The respondents were next asked a series of questions regarding their 
ability to provide intelligence support to the typical operations that SOF 
organizations conduct. The four supported mission types questioned are inherent 
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SOF operations, conducted throughout the spectrum of conflict.60  As Table 4 
illustrates, the respondents indicated that they marginally agreed with their ability 
to provide intelligence support to MA, DA, SR, and COIN operations. 
 
Table 4.   Views on Function Capabilities 
3. Roles 
The last section for capability self-assessments was to identify the 
respondents’ ability to fill critical roles and positions within an intelligence support 
element or organization. These roles and responsibilities fall in line, generally, 
with individuals in section, cell, or organization leadership positions. As with the 
other areas regarding self-assessment, the respondents marginally agreed with 
their ability to provide management and oversight of these roles (see Table 5).   
                                            




Table 5.   Views on Role Capabilities 
F. INSTRUCTOR ASSESSMENTS OF STUDENT CAPABILITIES 
The last two questions of this survey focused on perceptions, 
observations, and assessments of the students by NSTEP instructors and were 
presented in an open-ended format. Six instructors provided input to these two 
questions and the responses indicate that a large portion of students arrive for 
training with a limited understanding of the intelligence discipline. One instructor 
responded that a large number of students attend the intelligence courses as 
operations officers that will be, or newly assigned to intelligence positions. These 
individuals bring a wealth of operational knowledge and the clear understanding 
what tactical elements need to complete successful missions, but lack the basic 
understanding of analysis. 
Another instructor’s response indicates that the course prerequisites for 
students are not always met, placing attendees at a significant disadvantage. 
This issue limits the input into class discussions and participation, forcing the 
instructor to focus more time attempting to educate those with minimal 
experience. This instructor further explained that students with the lack of 
previous training and deployment experience have issues during practical 
exercises, especially during the advanced intelligence course. 
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G. SUMMARY 
The overall purpose of this survey was to identify personal strengths of 
NSTEP students regarding the assessments of their intelligence application 
skillsets. The responses provided from the survey pool illustrated that these 
students did retain a level of comfort to conduct the required tasks to provide 
intelligence support to SOF elements conducting full spectrum operations. This 
information is critical for both the units that provide these students and the 
instructors at the NSTEP. The positive feedback from students will likely increase 
due to a continuously updated training curriculum that provides instruction of the 
latest information and intelligence processes. The NSTEP as a whole can use 
this feedback to incorporate new training material based on lessons learned from 
personal experience and current operations. 
The intent of this survey was to reach out to a significant pool of current 
and former students of the NSTEP. Although the response was only 18%, the 
demographics provided a broad sample regarding rank, years of service, and 
military career paths. The initial assessment is that the NATO SOF partners use 
the NSTEP to round out and update existing training. In some instances, the 
training the NSTEP provides serves as the only instruction some intelligence 
personnel receive. Two respondents provided additional comments regarding 
Intelligence Officer Career development stating that within their militaries, there is 
no intelligence officer branch, but intelligence positions that are filled once or 
twice over a soldier’s career. During these circumstances, the NSTEP fills the 
critical role in training these personnel to assume their duties as SOTU and 
SOTG staff intelligence officers.    
In order to reach out to as many potential subjects as possible, the 
researcher presented an overview of this research to four courses in session 
over a five-day visit to Mons, Belgium. Additional assistance was provided by the 
NSHQ J2 shop, who maintains former student databases. These databases 
provided e-mail contacts for these former students in an effort to reach out to a 
larger pool of subjects. As previously stated in this chapter, only 6 surveys were 
 47
conducted on site and the remaining 27 were completed online. The lack of in-
person surveys is assessed to be due to anonymity of the survey participants. 
This survey additionally provided participants the opportunity to add personal 
comments along with their selections to various questions. Although a limited 
number of participants provided additional comments, the few that were provided 
added insight to NSTEP attendance and the likely impressions that NATO SOF 





































VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The beginning of this thesis discussed the critical need for the 
development of intelligence capabilities for NATO SOF operations. Both of these 
chapters identified potential gaps in training and provided models on the types of 
intelligence organizations. The importance of SOF intelligence within these two 
chapters was emphasized based on the sensitivity of the operations conducted 
by these elite units as well as the needed training that supports these activities. 
Chapter One discussed the issue of new, and partially trained, intelligence 
personnel assigned to critical positions within the SOF intelligence strata as 
being a common occurrence. Due to the nature of career progression, this is the 
process within many of NATO SOF organizations. 
Chapter Three provided a case study on the ISAF SOF Fusion Cell. This 
cell led the way for intelligence support in Afghanistan, and helped to develop the 
NSTEP training curriculum. This organization has grown, not only in personnel, 
but in its capabilities and functions as a leading intelligence support organization 
in the Afghan theater. In this growth, the requirements levied on the SOFFC have 
provided the opportunity for the NSTEP to earn the reputation as a foundation in 
NATO SOF training. 
Next, this research dissected the NSTEP curriculum and provided a 
concise overview the F3EA-D process. This targeting process, feedback from 
assessments and from deployments, has driven the development of courses that 
best meet the requirements for supporting NATO SOF operations. This evolution 
in training has afforded many NATO SOF personnel to attend cutting edge 
training on a multitude of disciplines that are geared for both the operator and the 
intelligence professional. 
The following chapter of this research offered an explanation into the 
framework of the NSTEP training describing it as a foundation and finishing 
 50
school. The concept of this thesis was to examine the need of a mid-career 
intelligence officer’s course that provides validation to NATO SOF officers. The 
growth of the NSTEP has allowed NATO SOF personnel the opportunity to offer 
lessons learned from operational deployments and reap the benefits of ongoing 
updated training. This cycle not only benefits the students that attend the training, 
but NSHQ, as a whole, has the ability to modify and update doctrine as needed.    
The NSHQ J2 directorate has the mission of defining the intelligence process, 
improving current competences, establishing future information exchange 
requirements, and identifying future ISR capability requirements.61  The 
multinational makeup of this directorate and the direct input of the J2 into the 
NSTEP facilitate this mission. As the J2 directorate continues to meet the 
objectives of the focus areas, the NSTEP training curriculum continues growing 
to meet the new challenges that NATO SOF will face in the future. 
Additionally, this research provides insight into NSTEP history and 
considers its future capabilities. In order to meet the growing global interests of 
NATO SOF and to counter threats, the NSTEP has developed a road map to 
grow the needed intelligence personnel to meet these challenges. The NSTEP 
has provided a recommended, three phased approach to grow NATO SOF 
Intelligence professionals (see chapter IV.C.).This training outline provides a 
clear roadmap for NATO SOF partners to validate the progression of their 
intelligence personnel. This model also outlines the expansion of their collective 
capability from the SOTU up to the SOTG level of commands. Commands that 
do not take the opportunity to spread training across the entire unit limit the 
overall capability of the units placing the majority of the workload on fewer 
soldiers.   
                                            
61 NSHQ, “NSHQ J2, SOIB, and SOFFC:  And the Formation of the NSHQ Special 
Operations Component Command,” May 2012, 3. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATO SOF INTELLIGENCE TRAINING 
When comparing NATO SOF Intelligence Officers to U.S. Army 
Intelligence Officers, the requirements, needed skillsets, and characteristics are 
not different. The U.S. Army Military Intelligence Captain Career Course (MICCC) 
is a 20 week curriculum that prepares intelligence officers to lead soldiers and 
civilians in directing, collecting, processing, producing, and disseminating 
intelligence.62  U.S. Army Intelligence Officers are required to be versatile and 
exhibit confidence of the multi-intelligence disciplines. Additionally, Intelligence 
Officers must be able to communicate and integrate products from each of the 
disciplines into their own intelligence products. By doing this, the intelligence 
officer is able to provide a clear and coherent picture for the commander and 
decision makers.63   
The three-phased intelligence training approach of the NSTEP that has 
been covered is a valid model in developing NATO SOF intelligence officers. The 
total time that is required to complete all three phases is approximately 17 
weeks, covering eight separate courses. These eight courses provided the 
needed skillsets that intelligence personnel receive to support NATO SOF 
operations, but lack the management and staff training that is necessary for 
overseeing and driving full spectrum intelligence operations. 
To be more effective staff officers, intelligence officers should also attend 
some non-intelligence focused courses offered by the NSTEP. The Special 
Operations Component Command (SOCC) Staff Course is a one week course 
that establishes the student’s foundation for doctrine, terminology, and staff 
processes associated with working in a SOF component command 
headquarters.64  The SOCC Planning course is the second course that provides 
                                            
62 Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Military Intelligence Captain Career Course,” 
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/thesaurus/toc.asp?id=36262, (assessed 4 September 2012). 
63 Department of the Army. Pamphlet 600–3 “Commissioned Officer Professional 
Development and Career Management.” Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2010, 241. 
64 NSTEP website, http://www.nshq.nato.int/NSTEP/.  
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this critical staff training. This course is focused on the staff officers that will fill 
planning positions within a SOF component command and the process 
associated with the commander’s planning requirements for his staff. These two 
courses add an additional three weeks to the initial three phased intelligence 
training regimen, bringing the total training time to 20 weeks.   
C. IMPLEMENTING A NEW TRAINING PIPELINE 
1. EXISTING TRAINING CURRICULUM 
The NSTEP possesses the needed courses to provide a validation for a 
NATO SOF Intelligence officer. Although partner countries have an intelligence 
career branch, survey results indicate that a large percentage of NATO SOF 
Intelligence officers begin their career as operators, or another branch. These 
students use the courses at the NSTEP to develop and enhance their intelligence 
skill sets and to prepare for deployments.   
2. A PROPOSED TRAINING TIMELINE 
In order to create a validation course that will provide credentialed NATO 
SOF Intelligence Officers, NSHQ and the NSTEP can take the existing courses 
and modify the timeline to encompass the needed requirements and skillsets 
training. Using the existing courses and creating two new courses, the NSTEP 
would be able to provide credential producing curriculum. In order to achieve this 
task, the NSTEP courses can be broken down by functions and taught over a 
four month period. These functional blocks will provide staff training, core skillset 
training, specialized skillset training, exploitation skillset development, and 
advanced skillset development. 
a. Staff Training Block 
To achieve this curriculum development, the first block of training; 
staff training, establishes a foundation for personnel that have never served as 
staff officers. This block should include the two existing NSTEP courses; the Staff 
Officer’s Course and the Staff Planner’s Course. A third, future course, would 
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cover the staff officer’s writing requirements. This course would cover the orders 
production, as well as the additional documentation such as the production of an 
intelligence estimate. Figure 12 illustrates the course breakdown, over the first 
two weeks of training. Providing the critical foundation of the roles and 
responsibilities of being a staff officer is key to the overall success of a 
commander’s staff. 
 
Figure 12.  Staff Training Block 
b. Core Skillset Development 
The NATO SOF Intelligence Course has provided a solid 
foundation for developing analyst capabilities and prepared intelligence staffs for 
deployments. The NSIC is the basis for the development of the core skillsets for 
intelligence officers. It offers access to the various databases and software 
platforms that NATO SOF staffs are currently using to support operations in 
Afghanistan. The origin of this course dates back to the beginning of the NSTEP 
training curriculum and is constantly updated to meet the needs of the 
operational units deployed to various theaters and environments.   
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Continued emphasis on the importance for students to attend this 
training allows soldiers new to intelligence to grasp the fundamental skillsets to 
facilitate operations with thorough analysis and production. This course also 
takes seasoned intelligence officers and exposes them to multinational 
environments, providing the opportunities to get “hands on” access to real time, 
raw information and create actionable intelligence products. The NSIC is the 
perfect platform and should not be modified in this course of action. Although this 
course does not provide the management oversight that intelligence leaders 
need; this course serves as the fundamental building block for this validation (see 
Figure 13).  
 
Figure 13.  Core Skillset Development Block 
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c. Specialized Skillset Development 
The current NSTEP courses in the fields of imagery, HUMINT, 
SIGINT, and targeting develops a track for students. Figure 14 illustrates how 
this block is planned with the first three weeks concentrating on an overview of 
these intelligence disciplines, with the final week acting as a summarization of 
these courses. Although some NATO SOF organizations do not possess all of 
these disciplines, this exposure prepares students to operate in multinational 
environments. These training opportunities open doors to expansion of NATO 
SOF capabilities as a whole. NATO SOF branches out from these capabilities to 
meet future challenges. Expanding capabilities, additionally, allows for better 
interoperability when conducting multinational operations, leading to smooth 
formations of CFSOCC headquarters and other types of NATO SOF 
organizations.   
These courses only provide limited training; therefore additional 
NSTEP courses must be developed to provide specialized validation for 
students. These four courses allow an opportunity for students to utilize how 
these disciplines work together to provide critical information to intelligence. 
Additionally, students will begin to understand how to incorporate this information 
into the targeting cycle. Even though most students who attend this training will 
do so with limited, or no experience, in these fields, these courses will allow 
these students to see how SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMINT operations are 
conducted. Then students discover how the three disciplines provide 
corroborating evidence to find and fix targets on the battlefield. 
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Figure 14.  Specialized Skillset Development Block 
d. Exploitation Skillset Block 
Growing emphasis has been placed on exploitation and capturing 
this information when dealing with prosecution and developing targetable 
information. The development of this field has given rise to new organizations 
and focused training in both the Iraqi and Afghan theaters of operations. The two 
NSTEP courses that provide this critical training are the Cellular Exploitation and 
the Technical Exploitation Operations Coordinator courses. These courses are 
geared to both operators and intelligence professionals and illustrate how the 
exploitation process is conducted and how this information is developed into 
evidence and intelligence (Figure 15). These two courses can be covered over a 
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two period, providing the overview and TTPs needed to conduct exploitation 
operations and the analysis associated with them.     
 
Figure 15.  Exploitation Skillset Development Block 
e. Advanced Skillset Block 
The final phase of this validation curriculum is made up of three 
training blocks:  the TNAC, a future course that highlights intelligence support to 
military assistance, and a CAPSTONE exercise (Figure 16). The TNAC focuses 
on the advanced skillsets needed to oversee intelligence processes. Equally 
important, the TNAC works to conduct the innovative analysis needed to develop 
intelligence products in an asymmetric battle space. These two new blocks of 
instruction provide students the opportunity to develop intelligence that supports 
the information and TTP-sharing process during partner development.   
Even though not all NATO SOF organizations maintain an MA role, 
all that participate in ISAF operations are partnered with some type of Afghan 
security force during their deployment. This role is critical and must go beyond 
the tactical training of skillsets. Developing a partner’s capability to execute the 
“find and fix” blocks of the targeting cycle facilitates growth in overall capability of 
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that partner force. The final block for this proposed curriculum is roleplaying. 
Allowing the students to fill multiple roles and execute the required intelligence 
tasks associated with them, enables the students “operate” and lead during 
potential situations. This provides immediate feedback to both the students and 
the instructors on strengths and weaknesses. During this exercise, the students 
must be rotated to ensure that they grasp the training material while furthering 
the development of their managerial processes. 
 
Figure 16.  Advanced Skillset Development Block 
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D. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES 
In order for this curriculum to possess the needed accreditation, all of 
NATO must agree to the value of the course and identify it as an option for 
training NATO SOF intelligence personnel. If this agreement is not met, the 
course will not be viewed as a validation producing course, potentially leaving 
some graduates unqualified by their home countries. An additional challenge of 
this course is a perceived infringement of career track training of partner nations, 
without their oversight. From the survey data, many attendees of the NSTEP 
training routinely fill staff positions as part of their career progression. On 
occasion, these duties can lead an individual down a different career path. 
However, in most cases, this duty is temporary and encompasses only one to 
two years.   
Another potential setback for NATO SOF partners is the amount of time 
spent away during training. This absence leaves a critical position unmanned for 
a significant period of time. The length of training and the short term assignment 
could persuade NATO SOF partners to continue to use the NSTEP’s individual 
course menu. Some NATO SOF commands will likely continue to send their 
intelligence soldiers to one or two short courses based on unit OPTEMPO and 
section strength. This action will provide these individuals the needed tools to 
effectively support their commanders, but will lack the multidiscipline training.   
E. WAY AHEAD FOR INTELLIGENCE TRAINING 
The NSTEP has all of the tools needed to develop a mid-career 
intelligence officer’s course that provides an accreditation to the students. These 
courses cover the specific areas of study to provide overview of multisource 
intelligence and staff operations. To complete this curriculum, the NSTEP must 
develop additional training that covers written products and intelligence support 
to military assistance. These two new courses will provide training and exposure 
in areas that are difficult to master and learned on the job during deployments. 
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The ability to bring together staff officers from various nations to build a 
combined NATO SOF command can be a difficult task. By establishing this 
curriculum, NSHQ will be able to provide a complete training package and 
certification to NATO SOF intelligence officers. This endorsement and training 
will facilitate interoperability when NATO SOF is called on to conduct operations 
in the future. The need to operate in a multinational environment has been tested 
for the last eleven years—providing a common training pipeline is the step 
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